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Medical Malpractice and Physician
Accountability: Trends in the Courts and
Legislative Responses*
Theodore R. LeBlang**
INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, the United States has witnessed
several malpractice "crises," characterized by a lack of availabil-
ity of medical malpractice insurance. In large part, these crises
have been triggered by marked increases in medical malpractice
claims frequency and/or claims severity-that is increases in the
number of claims filed and/or the size of settlements or
judgments.
Recently, the insurance industry reported that during the pe-
riod between 1985 and 1990, there was a moderation in the fre-
quency of claims being filed, although the size of claims
continued to increase.1 This national experience continued into
the early 1990s, with the number of claims per 100 physicians
falling from 14.3 in 1991 to 14.1 in 1992.2 Nevertheless, the me-
dian verdict for medical malpractice claims during the period
between 1987 and 1991 rose from approximately $350,000 to ap-
proximately $465,000, a trend that is expected to continue.3
Moreover, reports from various sources indicate that the down-
* This article is based upon Professor LeBlang's speech delivered at the Fourth
Annual Comparative Health Law Conference, "Medical Malpractice: A Comparative
Analysis," sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for
Health Law in October of 1993.
** Theodore R. LeBlang is a Professor of Medical Jurisprudence and Chairman
of the Department of Medical Humanities at Southern Illinois University School of
Medicine. He serves as the Director of the Program of Law and Medicine and the
Director of the Medicine/Juris Doctor Dual Degree Program. He received his Bache-
lor of Arts in 1970 from Pennsylvania State University and his Juris Doctor in 1974
from University of Illinois College of Law. Professor LeBlang is the Editor of the
Journal of Legal Medicine and a member of the Board of Editors of the Illinois Bar
Journal and the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics.
1. Ruth Gastel, Medical Malpractice, in INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, IN-
SURANCE ISSUES UPDATE (Oct. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Christine Woolsey, Jury Awards Rise, Bus. INs., Apr. 12, 1993, at 2, 17.
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ward trend in claims frequency may now be coming to an end.4
A renewed growth in claims frequency may be traced, in part,
to a variety of recent judicial decisions that appear to expand
the scope of physician accountability within the framework of
the physician-patient relationship. Based upon both substantive
and procedural considerations, these decisions have legitimized,
or reinforced the legitimacy of, a broad array of malpractice
causes of action. The first section of this article will examine
selected decisions that have expanded physicians' duties, while
the second section will look at examples of legislative efforts to
curb the growth of medical malpractice claims.
I. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS
In the March, 1993 case of Faya v. Almaraz,5 Maryland's high-
est court addressed the question of whether or not a surgeon
who is infected with the AIDS virus is legally obligated to in-
form his or her surgery patients of this fact prior to performing
surgery. Rudolph Almaraz, a surgeon who specialized in treat-
ing breast cancer, knew that he was HIV positive. Despite this
fact, he performed a partial mastectomy and axillary dissection
on Sonja Faya in 1988, followed by removal of an axillary hema-
toma in early 1989. In October of 1989, Dr. Almaraz was diag-
nosed with AIDS. A month later, he surgically removed a
benign lump from the breast of Perry Rossi.
Due to his illness, Dr. Almaraz gave up his medical practice in
March of 1990. He died approximately eight months later, at
which time Ms. Faya and Ms. Rossi learned of their surgeon's
illness from local newspapers. Both underwent blood testing for
HIV but neither showed evidence of seroconversion. Neverthe-
less, both patients sued the estate of Dr. Almaraz and Johns
Hopkins Hospital for compensatory and punitive damages.
Although neither plaintiff challenged the therapeutic outcome
of their surgeries, both alleged that Dr. Almaraz acted wrong-
fully by failing to inform them of his illness prior to operating on
them. As a result, the plaintiffs argued that Dr. Almaraz placed
them at risk of exposure to AIDS-a risk that might otherwise
have been avoided if they had been properly informed and had
refused to consent to the invasive surgery. The plaintiffs
claimed that they suffered from severe emotional distress and
4. Gastel, supra note 1; Brian McCormick, Liability Premiums Going Up; Unclear
How Many, How High, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 6, 1993, at 1.
5. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
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anxiety as a result of the risk of exposure to HIV as well as the
need for continued testing and surveillance for the disease.
The defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds that the
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. The estate of Dr. Al-
maraz claimed that disclosure of HIV status is not an element of
the informed consent information exchange between physician
and patient. The hospital claimed that it had no duty to investi-
gate and determine the health status of Dr. Almaraz nor was it
obligated to make any disclosures to the plaintiffs under the
doctrine of informed consent. Both defendants further argued
that the plaintiffs' complaints were not legally cognizable be-
cause neither plaintiff had contracted the AIDS virus.
The trial court agreed and dismissed the claims, noting that
there were "no reported cases of transmission of AIDS from a
surgeon to a patient."'6 Moreover, the court stated that such
transmission "is only a theoretical possibility when proper bar-
rier techniques are employed . . . ." In the case at bar, the
plaintiffs had not alleged that Dr. Almaraz negligently failed to
use proper barrier techniques. The trial judge also refused to
accept the theory that recovery in such a case could be based on
a fear of contracting AIDS when, at the time of litigation, the
plaintiffs were not HIV positive.
The Maryland Court of Appeals issued a special writ to ad-
dress what it considered to be an important and timely issue.
Noting that the concept of legal duty emanates from a responsi-
bility to exercise due care, the court held that regardless of the
fact that there is an extremely low risk of HIV transmission in
the types of surgeries performed on the plaintiffs, the risk may
nevertheless be viewed as unreasonable. In reversing the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaints, the Maryland high
court stated that it was unable to conclude "as a matter of law
that no duty was imposed upon Dr. Almaraz to warn the [plain-
tiffs] of his infected condition or [to] refrain from operating
upon them."8
The court further ruled that the plaintiffs' fears of acquiring
HIV infection, accompanied by headaches, inability to sleep,
and physical and mental anguish due to the need for repeated
HIV testing, could constitute legally compensable injuries. Re-
covery would be permitted for injuries suffered between the
6. Id. at 330.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 333-34.
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time the plaintiffs learned of the surgeon's illness and the time
of a relatively certain negative test result-an approximate six-
month period.9
While this case of first impression in Maryland appears to be
far reaching in articulating the scope of physician accountability
for disclosure under the doctrine of informed consent, it does
not stand alone. Similar cases have expanded physician disclo-
sure obligations to include information about HIV infection1"
and chronic alcohol abuse.1 Courts have also expanded physi-
cian accountability in situations where plaintiffs suffer negli-
gently inflicted emotional distress.
In a 1993 Virginia case, Howard v. Alexandria Hospital,12 the
plaintiff filed a malpractice action claiming that during carpal
tunnel surgery, certain instruments were used that had not been
sterilized adequately. The plaintiff claimed that as a direct re-
sult, she sustained pain and suffering, mental anguish, inconven-
ience, discomfort, and "increased anxiety in the extreme,"
particularly with respect to the possibility of getting AIDS. At
trial, the evidence established that while the plaintiff was in the
recovery room, the surgeon advised her of the possibility that
the instruments he used were possibly not sterile. It appeared
that a nurse in charge of the autoclave, a machine used to steril-
ize instruments, failed to properly monitor the equipment.
Upon being informed of this fact, the plaintiff experienced fear
of several diseases including AIDS, hepatitis B, staphylococcal
infection, and tetanus.
The surgeon asked an infectious disease specialist to attend
the plaintiff while she was in the hospital. During the three-day
period following the surgery, the plaintiff experienced severe
headaches, nausea, and vomiting. She received pain medication
and intravenous antibiotics. Following her release from the hos-
9. Id. at 336-37.
10. See K.A.C. v. Benson, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 1201 (Dec. 14, 1993) (relying
on Faya), review granted, 1994 Minn. LEXIS 155 (Feb. 24, 1994); Estate of Behringer
v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1279-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)
(duty to disclose HIV infection prior to performing invasive ontology, or ear, nose,
and throat, surgery). For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Theodore
LeBlang, Obligations of HIV-Infected Health Professionals to Inform Patients of Their
Serological Status: Evolving Theories of Liability, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317
(1994).
11. Hidding v. Williams, 578 S.2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (decompressive
laminectomy was followed by loss of bowel and bladder control; informed consent
should have included information about surgeon's chronic alcohol abuse prior to and
at time of surgery).
12. 429 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1993).
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pital, the plaintiff was required to take medications that appar-
ently caused nausea and vomiting as well as a raw mouth, nose,
and sinus cavity. She was also informed that HIV testing would
be necessary in six months.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's trial, the defendants
moved to strike the plaintiff's evidence on the grounds that her
claim essentially stated a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, which was not recognized as a compensa-
ble injury. The court granted the motion, concluding the trial.
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the hospi-
tal's use of improperly sterilized medical equipment caused the
plaintiff to suffer physical pain and discomfort as well as mental
anguish and emotional distress-resulting from fear about her
own physical condition and about possible contamination of her
family and friends. In light of these facts, the Virginia Supreme
Court held that the trial court erred when it struck the plaintiff's
evidence and ordered a summary judgment. 3 In reaching this
decision, the court grappled with the extent to which it would
recognize and support a cause of action for infliction of emo-
tional distress-a claim which, in Virginia, ordinarily requires
contemporaneous physical injury to the plaintiff. The court con-
cluded that headaches, nausea, vomiting, unusual sweating, and
a "raw" mouth, nose, and sinus cavity constituted sufficient
physical injury to sustain the plaintiff's claim.
A New Jersey court was willing to go even further in this re-
gard. In the 1993 case of Carey v. Lovett,14 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that parents could recover for emotional
distress caused by malpractice resulting in the premature birth
and death of their baby-without being required to prove physi-
cal injury to themselves. The plaintiff, JoAnn Carey, suffered
from diabetes. Her first child was delivered one month prema-
ture and, although suffering from toxemia, was otherwise
healthy. A second pregnancy ended in miscarriage. In October
of 1983, while in the twenty-sixth week of her third pregnancy,
the plaintiff awoke one morning with elevated blood sugar
levels, which she was unable to lower throughout the day. Fol-
lowing numerous telephone calls to the office of her internist,
who had managed her other pregnancies, she was told to report
to the hospital the next morning. In a subsequent telephone call
from the hospital, she was told to report in the afternoon rather
13. Id. at 24.
14. 622 A.2d 1279 (N.J. 1993).
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than the morning. She was admitted at 1:00 p.m. with a diagno-
sis of "uncontrolled diabetes, six months pregnant.' 15
Shortly after her admission to the hospital, the plaintiff was
examined by a physician who was covering for her internist. He
concluded that she was suffering from ketoacidosis, a dangerous
condition resulting from excess acidity of the blood. Because
the condition often causes intrauterine death, the physician lis-
tened for fetal heart sounds but detected none. The hospital no-
tified the plaintiff's obstetrician of the examination results.
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff experienced strong contractions.
Two nurses were unable to detect fetal heart sounds. A third
nurse was contacted who was also unable to hear fetal heart
sounds. The nurses telephoned the plaintiff's husband and her
obstetrician. The obstetrician advised the nurses to allow the
plaintiff to deliver what he expected would be a stillborn child.
The plaintiff's husband went directly to the hospital, where a
nurse informed both him and his wife that there were no audible
fetal heart tones and that the fetus was dead. The plaintiff in-
sisted that she could feel the fetus moving inside her and the
nurse again tested for fetal heart tones, finding none. She did
not use an ultrasound, a more accurate way of detecting fetal
viability.
Approximately eight hours after the plaintiff was admitted to
the hospital, she delivered a baby in a breech position. The
plaintiff's obstetrician was not present and neither of the two
nurses assisted in the actual delivery; the infant dropped unsup-
ported onto the labor bed. One nurse cut the umbilical cord and
a second nurse took the baby into another room, closed the
door, and placed the surprisingly healthy-looking baby on a
weighing scale, at which time the baby gasped for air. The nurse
detected a fetal heartbeat and the infant was rushed to the neo-
natal nursery. The child was severely brain damaged. Approxi-
mately ten days later, the child was removed from life support
machines while in a persistent vegetative state.
Mr. and Mrs. Carey subsequently initiated a lawsuit against
the patient's internist and obstetrician as well as various other
defendants. A jury returned a verdict against the two physi-
cians. The plaintiffs appealed and the intermediate reviewing
court concluded that the parents' claims for emotional distress
were not supported by the facts.
15. Id. at 1282.
[Vol. 3
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On further appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded
that the case posed the question of whether parents, without at-
tempting to prove physical injury to themselves, are entitled to
recover for emotional distress caused by medical malpractice
that resulted in the premature birth and death of their baby. In
reaching a decision in the case, the court emphasized that it was
concerned with the potential effects of expanded liability on the
medical profession and society. Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that both the mother and father could recover for emo-
tional distress under the facts of the case.16
The court observed that mother and fetus are interconnected
and the mother is more than a mere bystander. A woman who
has been told that her fetus is dead, but then learns that it was
born alive but impaired, has sustained the type of severe emo-
tional trauma that merits compensation. 17 With respect to the
father, if he occupies an intimate family relationship to the
mother and baby and suffers severe emotional distress from wit-
nessing the malpractice and its effect on the baby, he is also enti-
tled to recover damages.18 Thus, despite the court's recognition
that decisions of this nature have the potential to expand liabil-
ity for medical malpractice in our society, the facts of the case
justified recovery for severe emotional distress, even in the ab-
sence of physical injury to the parents. 19
The Carey decision evidences an expanded notion of physi-
cian accountability in the context of medical malpractice litiga-
tion. A similar judicial extension of physician accountability is
seen in a December, 1992 decision of the Supreme Court of In-
diana. In Walker v. Rinck,2° the court ruled that a physician
owes a duty to future children of an Rh-negative woman who
gives birth to an Rh-positive child.
In October of 1975, the patient's obstetrician informed her
that she was pregnant. The patient notified him that she had
Rh-negative blood and he ordered blood tests, which errone-
ously reported that the patient had Rh-positive blood. As a re-
sult, in June of 1976, when her first child was born with Rh-
positive blood, no RhoGAM21 injections were given to the pa-
16. Id. at 1288.
17. Id. at 1286-87.
18. Id. at 1287.
19. Id. at 1287-88.
20. 604 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 1992).
21. RhoGAM is used to prevent the formation of antibodies in situations where
an Rh-negative pregnant woman gives birth to a child with Rh-positive blood. In the
1994]
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tient. The plaintiff's body then formed antibodies to Rh-posi-
tive blood. Five years later, the plaintiff gave birth to a second
child who had Rh-positive blood. The child suffered from ane-
mia and respiratory problems. Twins were born four years later,
one of whom had Rh-positive blood. This child suffered hearing
impairments, motor skill deficiencies, and possible mental retar-
dation. The other twin, who had Rh-negative blood, suffered
from asthma.
All three children sued the obstetrician and the clinical labo-
ratory that tested the blood, alleging that the defendants' negli-
gence prior to and at the time of the birth of the mother's first
child in 1976 injured them. The defendants filed motions for
summary judgment, which the trial court granted based, among
other things, on Indiana's refusal to recognize a preconception
cause of action. Following appellate court review, the case was
considered by the Supreme Court of Indiana.2
The defendant obstetrician argued that he did not owe a duty
to the children because no physician-patient relationship ever
existed between them. However, the court noted that there is a
well-established medical practice of administering RhoGAM to
Rh-negative mothers who give birth to Rh-positive children to
protect future children from clearly foreseeable injury. Because
the Walker children were beneficiaries of their mother's rela-
tionship with her physician, the court concluded that public pol-
icy favored the existence of a duty on the part of the obstetrician
toward the children to use reasonable care regarding adminis-
tration of RhoGAM to the mother. Despite claims by the de-
fendants that allowing this action to proceed would "add fuel to
the burning medical crisis in the State of Indiana, 23 the court
concluded that to preclude the Walker children from seeking
compensation for their injuries, which were a foreseeable conse-
quence of the negligence of the defendants, would be contrary
to fundamental principles of tort law.24
Similar claims by physician defendants that traditional tort li-
ability should not be extended beyond manageable bounds were
event of subsequent pregnancy, these antibodies may cause serious injury to a child
born with Rh-positive blood. See J. E. SCHMIDT, ATrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER R-92 (1988).
22. In ruling on this case, the Indiana Supreme Court sought to resolve a conflict
between the Third District Court of Appeals in Walker and the First District Court of
Appeals in Yeager v. Bloomington Obstetrics, 585 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
23. 604 N.E.2d at 596.
24. Id. at 595-97.
[Vol. 3
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raised and rejected in the New York case of Miller v. Rivard.2 5
There, the court relied on principles of foreseeability to rule that
a physician may be held liable for a negligently performed va-
sectomy that results in injury to.the patient's spouse, despite the
absence of a physician-patient relationship between them. John
Miller contacted the defendant urologist who performed a va-
sectomy in April of 1987. Subsequently, in June of 1987 and
again in August of 1987, fertility tests were performed on Mr.
Miller's semen. Following the second test, Mr. Miller tele-
phoned the defendant's office and was advised by the nurse that
the vasectomy was successful and that he and his wife could re-
sume sexual relations without using contraceptive measures.
The following spring, however, Mrs. Miller learned that she was
pregnant. Subsequent fertility testing indicated that Mr. Miller
was, in fact, still fertile. Even though Mrs. Miller gave birth to a
healthy child, she suffered severe medical complications during
pregnancy and delivery, and ultimately required additional sur-
gery and a hysterectomy.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Miller filed a wrongful conception 26 suit
against the urologist and other defendants for a variety of inju-
ries. After the trial court dismissed two counts of the plaintiffs'
complaint and the defendants' affirmative defense, the parties
cross-appealed. The reviewing court focused on the question of
whether Mrs. Miller had a legally cognizable cause of action
against her husband's health care providers.
The defendants argued that in view of the lack of a physician-
patient relationship between Mrs. Miller and her physician, al-
lowing such a cause of action would constitute an unwarranted
and unmanageable expansion of traditional tort principles. The
court did not agree. Noting that the damages potentially recov-
25. 585 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
26. Wrongful conception lawsuits are commenced by the parents of a healthy, but
unplanned, newborn child to recover for physical as well as financial injuries resulting
from a negligently performed procedure, the purpose of which was the prevention of
conception and childbirth. THEODORE R. LEBLANG & W. EUGENE BASANTA, THE
LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIs 876-78 (1986). A wrongful conception claim
differs from a wrongful birth claim, where parents seek damages on their own behalf
for injuries sustained in connection with giving birth to a disabled child. In these
cases, parents allege that as a result of medical malpractice, they were not informed
about the potential to give birth to a disabled child (for example, because of an un-
diagnosed genetic predisposition or a physician's failure to perform or to properly
perform appropriate prenatal testing). Id. at 879-80. Another related cause of action
is the wrongful life claim. This claim is similar to the wrongful birth claim, but com-
pensation for injuries is sought by the disabled child on its own behalf. Id. at 381-83
(Supp. 1993).
1994]
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erable by Mrs. Miller would be precisely the same as those she
would be able to recover if she had undergone an unsuccessful
tubal ligation, the court observed that "[t]here is no sound rea-
son in policy, fairness, or in the fulfillment of the role of tort law
as a deterrent to negligent conduct" to distinguish the exposure
to liability on the basis of the type of sterilization performed.
The court concluded that imposing liability on Mr. Miller's
health care providers for Mrs. Miller's damages, despite the ab-
sence of a physician-patient relationship, fell squarely within
traditional tort principles. Because the avoidance of a poten-
tially injurious fourth pregnancy was the essential purpose of
Mr. Miller's election to undergo a vasectomy, it was foreseeable
that if the physician performed the vasectomy negligently, then
Mrs. Miller might suffer serious injuries if she became pregnant.
Accordingly, the court ruled that it was appropriate to subject
the defendants to liability.28
Cases like the ones discussed above exemplify the manner in
which state courts have broadened physician accountability in
the context of health care delivery, fostering increases in the fre-
quency of medical malpractice litigation as well as the growing
severity of medical malpractice settlements and awards. There
is clear consensus that the costs of medical malpractice litigation
have contributed significantly to escalating health care costs in
the United States.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Perhaps the most obvious example of health care costs attrib-
utable to the medical liability system are the insurance premi-
ums paid by physicians and hospitals for medical malpractice
coverage.29 When measured as a fraction of the total cost of
physician services in this country, spending for medical malprac-
tice liability insurance premiums grew from 3.1 percent in 1982
to 4.8 percent in 1989, totaling $5.6 billion.30 More recent re-
ports suggest that in 1991 these premiums reached a total of $9.1
billion, an increase of more than 60 percent over 1989.31
27. 585 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
28. Id.
29. Peter P. Budetti, Malpractice and Access to Care, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 879
(1992). See also James W. Moser & Robert A. Musacchio, The Cost of Medical Pro-
fessional Liability in the 1980s, J. MED. PRAC. MGMT., Summer 1991, at 6.
30. Budetti, supra note 29, at 881.
31. Sean Taylor Simpson, Why We Can't Afford to Ignore Tort Reform, PRIVATE
PRAC., June 1993, at 36, 40.
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As a separate consideration, there is evidence that more than
eight out of ten physicians practice defensive medicine in an at-
tempt to protect themselves from being sued.32 Among other
things, the practice of defensive medicine includes ordering lab-
oratory tests or other diagnostic procedures that are not medi-
cally necessary or indicated, but that enhance a physician's
ability to successfully defend against a potential medical mal-
practice lawsuit.33
The amount of total health care costs for physician services
that may be attributed to the practice of defensive medicine has
been variously estimated to run between $4 billion and $25 bil-
lion per year.34 One survey estimated the cost of defensive
medicine at approximately $10 billion in 1991 and projected that
this amount would increase to approximately $15 billion (in
1991 dollars) by 1998. 35
Given the combined costs of professional liability insurance
premiums and the costs attributable to the practice of defensive
medicine, state and federal legislative proposals designed to
limit physician exposure to professional liability will likely have
an important impact in reducing total expenditures for physician
services as well as overall costs of health care in this country.36
For example, California's landmark Medical Injury Compen-
sation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) has long been considered
the "gold standard" in legislation intended to limit escalating in-
surance premiums and the costs of defensive medical practice.37
MICRA has four primary components. First, it places a
$250,000 limit on the amount of noneconomic damages that may
32. Gastel, supra note 1; Moser & Musacchio, supra note 29, at 8.
33. Budetti, supra note 29, at 883.
34. Edward Felsenthal, Cookbook Care: Maine Limits Liability for Doctors Who
Meet Treatment Guidelines, WALL. ST. J., May 3, 1993, at Al.
35. Kenneth Vatz, Caps Would Help, ILL. MED., May 21, 1993, at 7 (citing a study
conducted by the National Medical Liability Reform Coalition). See also Gastel,
supra note 1 (citing the same study). At this writing, the United States Congress
Office of Technology Assessment is conducting a comprehensive study to evaluate the
impact of defensive medicine on health care costs. As this article went to press, the
final report was released. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (OTA-M-602, July
1994).
36. See Moser & Musacchio, supra note 29; A. Russell Localio et al., Relationship
Between Malpractice Claims and Cesarean Delivery, 269 JAMA 366 (1993).
37. Brian McCormick, Draft Plan Offers Some Tort Relief, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept.
27, 1993, at 1. See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CON-
GRESS, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS (OTA-BP-H-
119, Oct. 1993); James Todd, Reform of the Health Care System and Professional Lia-
bility, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1733 (1993).
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be awarded to a medical malpractice plaintiff.38  Second,
MICRA limits attorneys contingency fees based upon a sliding
scale-attorneys can receive 40 percent of the first $50,000 of an
award, 33 1/3 percent of the next $50,000, 25 percent of the next
$500,000, and 15 percent of any amount over $600,000.39 Third,
MICRA provides that juries may be informed of the amount
payable to a plaintiff from collateral sources (such as health in-
surance, disability coverage, workers' compensation, and other
third-party payers).40 Juries are then permitted to exercise dis-
cretion in deducting collateral source payments when making
their damage award to the plaintiff. Finally, MICRA provides
for periodic payment of future damages in excess of $50,000
(such as medical treatments, loss of earnings, and noneconomic
damages).41 Under this provision, insurance companies are able
to purchase an annuity and pay out large judgments over an ex-
tended period of time rather than make a lump sum cash pay-
ment to the plaintiff.
As a result of the implementation of MICRA, medical mal-
practice insurance premiums for physicians in California de-
clined approximately 38 percent from 1976 to 1991, when
adjusted for inflation.42 As of 1992, liability insurance premiums
for California physicians were one third to one half of the
amounts paid by physicians in states that failed to enact such
reforms.43
Against the background of these statistics, as well as informa-
tion from other states that enacted similar reforms, commenta-
tors have observed that caps on noneconomic damages are the
most significant factor in holding down medical malpractice in-
surance rates. 4 Currently, approximately twenty states have
some type of cap on economic and/or noneconomic damages.
Moreover, nearly every state has enacted at least some mini-
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1994). Noneconomic damages compen-
sate individuals for pain and suffering, while economic damages compensate for such
things as past and future medical treatment costs and lost wages and/or profits, as well
as projected lost earnings.
39. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1990).
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1994).
41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1987).
42. Gastel, supra note 1.
43. CALIFORNIANS ALLIED FOR PATIENT PROTECTION, MICRA INFORMATION
(Jan. 1, 1993).
44. See Gina Kimmey, Caps at Work in California, ILL. MED., Sept. 10, 1993, at 9;
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 37, at 64.
45. See CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY, COMPENDIUM OF STATE SYSTEMS FOR RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL IN-
[Vol. 3116
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mum level of tort reform.'
Given the importance of such reform in reducing medical
malpractice liability insurance premiums and controlling the
practice of defensive medicine, President Clinton has incorpo-
rated medical malpractice tort reform in his comprehensive
strategy to reform the health care system. His 1993 Health Se-
curity Act 47 proposal includes the following recommended mal-
practice reforms.
Creation of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Each health plan would establish an alternative dispute reso-
lution process using one or more of several models. Potential
model systems include early offers of settlement, mediation, and
arbitration. Consumers with a claim against a health care pro-
vider in the plan would be required to submit the claim to the
plan's alternative dispute system; consumers who are not satis-
fied with the outcome could then pursue their claims in court.48
Requirement for a Certificate of Merit
Plaintiffs suing for injury from medical malpractice would be
required to include with their complaint an affidavit signed by a
medical specialist practicing in a field relevant to the claimed
injury. The affidavit would indicate that a specialist examined
relevant medical records and concluded that the medical proce-
dures or treatments in question deviated from established stan-
dards of care.49
Limits on Attorneys' Fees
Attorneys' fees in medical malpractice cases would be limited
to a maximum of 33 1/3 percent of the total award. States could
impose lower limits.5 0
JURY CLAIMS (Stephanie Spernak & Peter Budetti, eds. 1991); AMERICAN TORT RE-
FORM ASSOCIATION, TORT REFORM RECORD (June 30, 1993); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 37, at 26-27.
46. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 37, at 26-27.
47. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced Nov. 20). Given the ongo-
ing debate regarding health care reform and the President's Health Security Act, it is
appropriate to consider the recommended malpractice reforms listed herein as exam-
ples, for purposes of discussion, rather than as likely provisions of any public law that
may eventually be enacted.
48. Id. at § 5302.
49. Id. at § 5303.
50. Id. at § 5304.
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Collateral Sources
A medical malpractice award would be reduced by any
amounts recovered by a plaintiff from external sources such as
health insurance, workers' compensation payments, disability
insurance, or any other programs designed to compensate the
plaintiff for the same injury.51
Periodic Payment of Awards
Parties to a medical malpractice case could request that an
award be made payable in periodic installments, as appropriate,
to reflect past and future needs for medical and other related
services.52
Enterprise Liability Demonstration Project
Federal monies would be allocated to support state demon-
stration projects to establish enterprise liability. These projects
would be designed to determine whether substituting physician
liability with liability on the part of a health service plan would
lead to an improvement in the quality of care, reduction in the
practice of defensive medicine by physicians, and improved risk
management.53
Standards Based on Practice Guidelines
The Department of Health and Human Services would de-
velop a medical liability pilot program based on practice guide-
lines. Under this system, a physician would be permitted to
demonstrate that his or her professional conduct or treatment
complied with appropriate practice guidelines, thus providing a
defense in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The Department
would be given authority to work with the states to invest prac-
tice guidelines with the force of law to protect physicians and
other health care providers participating in the pilot program.54
The medical malpractice tort reform measures contained in
President Clinton's Health Security Act proposal have gener-
51. Id. at § 5305.
52. Id. at § 5306.
53. Id. at § 5311.
54. Id. at § 5312.
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ated considerable debate.55 Some have argued that without cap-
ping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, tort
reform cannot succeed in reducing health care costs and alleviat-
ing the need for physicians to engage in the practice of defensive
medicine.5 6 However, others have observed that despite the ab-
sence of caps on noneconomic damages, President Clinton's
proposal regarding practice guidelines may have the greatest po-
tential to reduce health care costs and eliminate defensive medi-
cal practice.
The Maine Medical Liability Demonstration Project,57 which
became effective in 1992, has shown that the use of practice
guidelines significantly influences physician conduct when pro-
tections are afforded to physicians who comply with them.5
Committees composed largely of physicians prepare practice
guidelines in the specialties of obstetrics/gynecology, radiology,
emergency medicine, and anesthesiology. The guidelines take
effect if more than one half of all physicians practicing in the
specialty choose to participate. Physicians who have notified
the Board of Registration in Medicine of their election to par-
ticipate in the project are permitted to prove that they have
complied with established parameters as an affirmative defense
in any medical malpractice lawsuit.5 9
As of May, 1993, Maine had issued 22 sets of checklists advis-
ing physicians on how to handle different patients under differ-
ent circumstances. Emergency room officials at Maine Medical
Center estimated that, as a result of these checklists, approxi-
mately 50 percent of victims of falls or automobile accidents re-
ceived neck x-rays costing $170, compared with about 95
55. See Brian McCormack, Hitting Tort Issues in Reform, AM. MED. NEWS, April
25, 1994, at 1. It is of interest to note that in its 1994 report to Congress, the Physician
Payment Review Commission advocated tort reform, including the following:
noneconomic damage limits; collateral source offset; limitation of attorneys' contin-
gency fees; shorter statutes of limitations; use of binding alternate dispute resolution
methods; and periodic payments of awards. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMIS-
SION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 289 (1994). Certificates of merit and practice
guidelines in malpractice cases were not included in the list of recommendations due
to a lack of current knowledge regarding potential effectiveness. Id.
56. See Arthur R. Traugott, Caps Are Cornerstone of Tort Reform, ILL. MED.,
Sept. 24, 1993, at 4.
57. These provisions were enacted as part of the Maine Health Security Act. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-79 (West Supp.1993).
58. See Felsenthal, supra note 34. For a detailed discussion of the Medical Liabil-
ity Demonstration Project in Maine, see UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MAINE'S USE OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO REDUCE
CosTs (GAO/HRD-94-8, Oct. 1993).
59. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975 (West Supp. 1993).
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percent of victims before the practice guidelines went into
effect.6 °
Since the time that Maine enacted this legislation, the states
of Florida,61 Minnesota, 62 and Vermont 63 also have enacted leg-
islation giving practice guidelines legal effect. 64 Florida and
Minnesota established mechanisms that permit the development
of practice parameters and authorize physicians to use compli-
ance with the guidelines as an affirmative defense in malpractice
litigation.65 In Vermont, guidelines will be developed for use as
evidence regarding the standard of care in claims that are re-
solved under the state's arbitration system.66
Numerous other states are currently considering similar legis-
lation, and practice guidelines are now being created by feder-
ally sponsored panels, medical specialty and subspecialty
societies, state governments, third-party payers, health mainte-
nance organizations, hospitals, and various other entities.67 In
fact, from 1990 through 1992, the number of guidelines indexed
by the American Medical Association increased from 700 to
over 1300.68 If practice guidelines continue to be developed,
then it is reasonable to anticipate that physician compliance with
guidelines will reduce the frequency and severity of medical
malpractice claims while, at the same time, improving the qual-
ity of care and reducing defensive medical practice.69
CONCLUSION
This evaluation of significant recent developments affecting
60. Felsenthal, supra note 34.
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.02 (West Supp. 1994).
62. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.34 (West Supp. 1994).
63. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7003 (Supp. 1993).
64. Linda Oberman, States Race to Whip Up Practice Guidelines; Too Many
Cooks? AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 4, 1993, at 1. See also UNITED STATES GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, supra note 58, at 96.
65. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.02; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.34. See also Three
States' Guidelines Projects, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 4, 1993, at 31.
66. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7003. See also Three States' Guidelines Projects,
supra note 65.
67. Richard N. Shiffman, Clinical Guidelines in Medical Practice, J. MED. PRAC.
MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 70. One recent publication advertises that it offers a com-
pendium of over 23,000 health care standards, clinical practice guidelines, laws, and
regulations. ECRI, HEALTHCARE STANDARDS (1994).
68. Shiffman, supra note 67.
69. See Deborah W. Garnick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number
and Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856 (1991). See also Edward B.
Hirshfeld, Practice Parameters and the Malpractice Liability of Physicians, 263 JAMA
1556 (1990).
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medical malpractice litigation in the United States shows that
state courts continue to impose increasingly more significant ob-
ligations on physicians in the context of the physician-patient re-
lationship. This is occurring, perhaps for the first time in the
history of modern medicine, at precisely the same time that fed-
eral and state governments are pursuing efforts to control health
care costs with extraordinary vigor.
The public policy favoring compensation for injured persons
within the venerable American tort law system conflicts with the
equally compelling public policy favoring universal access to af-
fordable, quality medical care. Clearly, to achieve access to af-
fordable health care in this country, there must be control of
escalating health care costs-driven up, in part, by increasing
medical malpractice insurance premiums and the high price of
defensive medicine.
The precise shape of medical malpractice tort reform in this
country remains to be seen. However, there can be little doubt
that new legislation at the state and federal level will begin to
have impact-probably significant impact-in reducing the fre-
quency and severity of medical malpractice claims throughout
the United States.
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